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The eyes of others our prisons; their thoughts our cages. 
Virginia Woolf,  




The expository aim of this paper is to map the emotional terrain occupied by friends, 
enemies and others.  The theoretical focus – that is, the explanatory purpose – is to 
explore two quite distinct matters: the psychological foundations and the moral 
appraisals of the emotional expression of human relationships.  Whether the emotional 
relations between individual persons are homologous to the relations between nation-
states is a question this paper may provoke, but will not seek to answer. 
Conceptual Framework 
The framework for expressing aversive and associative emotionsi in social relations 
may be stated in these terms: 
a) We appeal to friends.  Toward friends we express, as well as lay claim to, 
positive emotions that move us to acts of recognition, affection, solidarity, 
intimacy and mutual undertakings of many kinds.  The emotional effects 
include association, affinity, trust, love and identity. 
b) We exact claims against enemies through negative emotions that express 
dispositions of hatred, anger and fear.  These may move us to acts of 
aggression and violence.  The emotional effects are aversive and negative, 
seeking exclusion or destruction. 
c) We ignore the others.  This disposition may, subsequent in time and the 
acquisition of cognisance, lead to treating with others. 
The emotional spectrum between friends and enemies is dynamic, intense and 
complex.  Toward others, the emotional scale lacks intensity but may eventually exhibit 
emotional and psychological complexity.  When treating others, we may be moved to 
acts ranging from non-recognition to caution, curiosity, communication and commerce 
(in the original Latin senses of moving across, making a journey, negotiating an 
exchange).  The more intense forms of ‘treating’ are exhibited in the risks of exploration 
and in missionary zeal. For states, a ‘treaty’ or ‘treating with the enemy’ is a potential 
transitional phase when parties temporarily suspend the posture of enemies to consider 
moving from the disposition of enemies toward the less intense emotional treatment 
appropriate to others. 
Regarding Friends 
The relationships and emotional expressions of friendship are complex, dynamic and 
unstable.  We know this intuitively and experientially.  This complexity underlies the 
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rich etymology of ordinary language (briefly documented in the endnotes, infra) and is 
recognised, often by default, in political philosophy, law and politics.  The positive 
emotions embedded in the word friendii are interwoven, implicated and complicated in 
familial, sexual, friendly and civil relationships.  In the idea and experience of 
fraternity, for example, its positive expression of emotional affinity can be seen 
favourably: essential to social harmony, solidarity (in the ideal of the French 
Revolution) and equality. The intimacy implicit in friendship is expressed in the 
untranslatable French expression, nos semblables:  our familiars, our like, our own kind, 
those in whose face we see a reflection of ourselves.  
However, ties of intimacy and close family-like bond interposed in social relations 
raise questions of nepotism, secrecy and betrayal. The emotional, moral and political 
complexity of friendship may even be seen to have seditious effects.  E.M. Forster 
(1965) boasted that ‘...if I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying 
my friend I hope I should have the guts to betray my country.’  Love, especially erotic 
love, has long been regarded as a deleterious influence upon public obligations. Set 
apart as an irrational or corrupting influence in civil affairs and relegated to the private 
sphere, love has effectively been quarantined in Western political theory. This 
‘prejudice’ has been directed against both heterosexual and homosexual love as having 
potentially, indeed probably, insidious effects upon the probity of public life. ‘Getting 
into bed with someone’ is a clichéd sexual metaphor for dishonesty and corruption.  The 
prejudice sanctions marital and conjugal love as something to be sequestered and 
carefully regulated even in the domestic domain, but is inappropriate or subversive in 
the political domain.  When ‘legitimate’ conjugal relations are publicly observed, the 
liaison tends to be characterised as decadent, effete, pathetic:  thus the caricatures of 
Prince Phillip, the sniggers meted out to Maggie Thatcher’s milquetoast Dennis, or the 
assumptions of strife, ambition and conspiracy between the Clintons. 
By contrast, at the personal and private level, friendships are highly valued.  Yet 
they are notoriously costly, dynamic, risky and unstable.  Friendship easily converts 
into the negative emotional terrain of jealousy, envy, anger and hatred.iii  The 
ambiguous boundary between these emotional dispositions was long ago identified in 
an aphorism attributed to Aesop: ‘A doubtful friend is worse than a certain enemy. Let a 
man be one thing or the other, and we then know how to meet him.’ 
Similarly in politics (for example in groups, factions and parties; and perhaps 
especially among nations), friends are almost inherently unreliable, never far from 
suspicion of duplicity and betrayal.  Friends become the bitterest of enemies because of 
the potential for lost emotional investment, the inherent risk of mutual knowledge, and 
the betrayal of trust that feeds anger, aggression and hatred.  Machiavelli, among other 
political thinkers, made a point about the greater reliability of the negative emotion of 
fear in political relationships, between sovereigns as well as between the sovereign and 
the subject. 
Regarding Enemies 
Political theorists have paid little attention to the negative emotional terrain that both 
divides and connects enemies.  Perhaps there is some kind of denial at work in that 
aversion, at least in the Western traditions of Christian virtue and Enlightenment 
rationalism.  The hegemonic Christian morality grounded in humility and charity, that 
Machiavelli dared to reject, imposes an expanding taboo, in both law and scholarly 
inquiry, against the full range of mortal passions. Indeed, offence and hate have in 
recent decades been gradually subsumed as crimes by legislators and political theorists.  
These emotions, in their expression and disposition to action, have been quarantined as 
beyond the pale of what is natural, normal or tolerable (Morris, 2003; Herrick and 
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Berrill, 1992). Rarely have there been attempts (Corcoran 2001, 2003) to explore this 
unpleasant landscape better known to ancient philosophy.  
The emotional disposition toward an enemy involves fear and hatred.  As with 
friendship, this involves a complex interweaving of acquaintance and feeling.  It is an 
aversive posture based upon the paradoxical identity of a ‘known stranger’iv – the 
adversary, the barbarian, whom one does not know personally or intimately or 
intelligently, except for knowledge, generational or even legendary, of the hated enemy.  
Indeed one’s acquaintance may be limited to the elementary knowledge that they are 
the enemy.  Poets, revolutionaries and military strategists have long repeated the 
counsel, ‘Know thy enemy,’ v attributed to Sun Tzu, the 5th Century B.C. Chinese 
general, military strategist and author of The Art of War. 
Aristotle: Hating the Enemy 
Aristotle was explicit in designating hate as the appropriate emotional disposition 
toward enemies.  This connection is, in fact, an integral and unified conception 
expressed in the very phonetic and semantic roots of those two terms, hate and enemy. 
The Greek nominative for hate is ’Εχθος, and the verb ‘to hate, to be at enmity with’ is 
’εχθραινω.  Odi, the root for the Latin odium, is the nominative case for ‘I hate.’  A 
Latin synonym, enmity, is a derivative construction for enemy, the two words effectively 
serving as variants of the same root. 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric provide the loci classicæ for the 
philosophical and psychological analysis of hate. His analysis of this topic lies in his 
still influential account of the human emotions.  Importantly, Aristotle does not 
calibrate emotions – in their expression, experience or effect –along the ethical scale. 
That is, the emotions are neither distinguished nor classified as Εθικε: vices and virtues.  
Rather, they are natural organic forces.  Nevertheless the emotions, for Aristotle, have a 
share in reason, and function as important resources available to give effect to actions.  
Aristotle ignores Plato’s revolutionary principle in the Republic (I, 335d-e) that the path 
of wisdom and right action invariably directs us to will and do the good, even to one’s 
enemies.  Aristotle argues, to the contrary, that the emotion of hate is appropriately 
directed toward enemies, while friendship and love are directed to our fellow citizens, 
families and lovers.  There is a subtle but crucial distinction between anger and hatred, 
both powerful negative emotions.vi  Aristotle stipulates that ‘Enmity and Hatred … 
should be studied by reference to their opposites,’ namely, forms of friendship such as  
‘comradeship, intimacy, kinship, and so on’ (Rhetoric, 1382e).  
On the other hand, anger plays an associative and protective function with respect 
to ‘gatherings of men, in social life.’  Anger is something that we may well feel and 
needfully express even among fellow citizens: 
so much is plain, that the middle state [good temper] is praiseworthy – that in 
virtue of which we are angry with the right people, at the right things, in the 
right way’ (Ethics, 1126b). 
Similarly, in the Rhetoric (1379e), Aristotle states: ‘We feel anger with those who 
slight us in connexion with what we are as honourable men bound to champion – our 
parents, children, wives, or subjects.’ 
By contrast, the emotion of hate (enmity) is cold, remorseless and ‘unaccompanied 
by pain.’  It is how one deals with an implacable enemy in whom one has no hope or 
investment.  Here is Aristotle’s chillingly detailed definition of hate. 
Now whereas anger arises from offences against oneself, enmity may arise even 
without that;  we may hate people merely because of what we take to be their 
character.  Anger is always concerned with individuals – a Callias or a Socrates 
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– whereas hatred is directed also against classes;  we all hate any thief or 
informer.  Moreover, anger can be cured by time; but hatred cannot.  The one 
gains at giving pain to its object, the other at doing him harm;  the angry man 
wants his victims to feel; the hater does not mind whether he feels or not…. And 
anger is accompanied by pain, hatred is not; the angry man feels pain, but the 
hater does not.  Much may happen to make the angry man pity those who offend 
him, but the hater under no circumstances wishes to pity a man whom he has 
once hated: for the one would have the offenders suffer for what they have done; 
the other would have them cease to exist (13822a).vii 
Aristotle’s allowance of a telos for the emotion of hate appears to acknowledge the 
Homeric morality of warfare. For example, he exemplifies the virtue of courage in the 
Nicomachean Ethics (III, 8 circa 1116-17) by frequently quoting or alluding to the Iliad 
and the Odyssey.  The same idea is conveyed in Plato’s Republic when Polemarchus 
quotes the poet Simonides as his guide for right action:  ‘to render each his due….  
Friends owe it to them to do them some good and no evil … and there is due and owing 
from an enemy to an enemy what is also proper for him, some evil’ (Republic, 331e-
332b). 
One must remember that the ancient Greeks had enemies aplenty – real enemies. 
Sometimes they were Hellenes (the Spartans) but more profoundly and ‘naturally’ the 
enemy were βαρβαρος –– foreigners.  It is apposite to Aristotle’s view that even for 
Socrates it was ‘unnatural’ for Greeks to fight Greeks,viii whereas it is natural that the 
barbarians would be enemies to the Hellenes. 
I affirm that the Hellenic race is friendly to itself and akin, and foreign and alien 
to the barbarian….  We shall say that Greeks fight and wage war with 
barbarians, and the barbarians with Greeks, and are enemies by nature, and that 
war is the fit name for this enmity and hatred. Greeks, however, we shall say, are 
still by nature the friends of Greeks when they act in this way, but that Greece is 
sick in that case and divided by faction, and faction is the name we must give to 
that enmity (Republic V, 470c). 
Aristotle brings the emotion home when he claims in the Politics (1312b) that 
hatred is a disposition particularly directed toward tyrannies, that is, regimes that 
exclude the participation of its subjects. Such regimes are thus the object of 
condemnation and have no claim upon a person’s sense of obligation or emotional 
attachment.  Here again Aristotle makes comparisons between anger and hatred, and it 
is significant that anger is characterised as irrational, while hatred is rational:  
There are two chief motives which induce men to attack tyrannies – hatred and 
contempt.  Hatred of tyrants is inevitable, and contempt is also a frequent cause 
of their destruction….  Anger, too, must be included under hatred, and produces 
the same effects.  It is oftentimes even more ready to strike – the angry are 
impetuous in making an attack, for they do not follow rational principle….  
Hatred is more reasonable, for anger is accompanied by pain, which is an 
impediment to reason, whereas hatred is painless. 
For Aristotle, hate is the natural disposition toward those who oppose, threaten, 
deprive, invade, oppress and bid to destroy our freedom and extinguish our lives.  It 
would be unnatural, irrational and unmanly not to feel this.  Aristotle’s rhetorical and 
ethical systems assume that it is virtuous to know and hate our enemies and ultimately 
seek their destruction.  In a Homeric moral universe, it would be perverse, cowardly and 






The prominence and elaboration of ‘the Other’ in recent theory, critique and rhetoric is 
probably too widely known to require much exposition here. As a term whose 
etymology is relatively straightforward, otherix has received what can only be called 
fervid, intermingled theoretical attention: in feminist theory (Ahmed, 1998; Butler, 
1990; Hughes, 2000; Irigaray, 1985a 1985b, 1995; Lapinska, 2005); ethics (Levinas, 
1987, 2000; Guenther, 2006; Tascón, 2003); Lacanian psychoanalytic theory (Lacan, 
2006; Grosz, 1990; Kristeva, 1982; Mitchell and Rose, 1982); Orientalist critique and 
post-colonial theory (Ashcroft et al., 1989; Barker et al. 1985, Bhabha, 1990, 1994; 
Buyze, 2005; Jain, 2006; Said 1993, 1995; Spivak, 1987); and literary and 
historiographical theory (Bammer, 1995; Todorov et al., 1996; Sharrad, 2005).  This 
welter of critique has proliferated into wider regions such as education, journalism and 
health communication (Horsti, 2003; Johnson et al., 2004). 
Recent theoretical treatments of ‘the other’ draw upon an earlier body of 
sociological and anthropological literature on the place of ‘the stranger.’  In important 
respects, the postmodernists have inverted the earlier investigations of ‘displaced 
persons,’ especially in a normative sense. 
For Georg Simmel (1971), Alfred Schuetz (1944) and Margaret Wood (1934), the 
‘stranger’ is defined from the point of view of the ‘group’ or the ‘in-group’ – although 
they readily acknowledge that the ‘in-group’ members are equally strangers from the 
point of view of the stranger.  Their analytical viewpoint is ‘toward’ the stranger; their 
theoretical interest – the ‘problem’ as they see it – is the question of assimilation. How 
may the stranger reconcile with, fit into, accommodate and learn the ways of the group. 
By contrast, contemporary postmodern theorists, with few exceptions (Werbner, 
2001), effectively reverse the ‘problem.’ In this view, the cultural burden and moral 
initiative are transposed to the implicitly or explicitly dominant in-group of Anglo-
European nations or ‘Western society.’  The analytical and critical perspective is 
‘toward’ the dominant group from the point of view, or on behalf, of the Other, a 
phenomenal presence variously, and contradictorily, conceived as ‘constructed,’ 
inevitable or even ‘natural.’ The effect of this confrontation is to disempower, displace 
and dispossess the Other.  Yet paradoxically, the perceived danger of its presence 
threatens the dominant group by engendering confusion and fear, and by exposing its 
ideological failure and lack of will to provide resources to accommodate the stranger’s 
presence. 
In what might be seen as a further paradox, this new wave of postmodern theory, 
despite its reversal of perspective and moral burden, once again displaces and denies the 
agency of the Other, rendering them needy, subliminal and impotent.  It is the dominant 
culture that is culpable and morally responsible for the presence (indeed the very 
existence) of the Other, including its threat of danger.  The dominant society is charged 
with the heroic moral duty to foster, maintain and accommodate the Other.  Confront 
the danger by embracing it: ‘Love thine enemy.’ 
This poses an interesting question about the emotional terrain that must be 
traversed to achieve this reconciliation.  I suggest that this challenge underlies the 
revival of ethical theory – specifically the influence of Emmanuel Levinas and the 
emergence of care theory (Nortvedt, 2003; Groenhout, 2004) – and the implicit 
restoration of natural law in human rights advocacy (a pagan Trojan horse, one might 
say, for Christian ethics).  
Simone de Beauvoir’s (Beauvoir, 1949, 1950) distinction that women, despite their 
intermingled cohabitation, embody a kind of terra incognita, an ‘absolute other,’ 
became a seminal and highly heuristic concept that inspired a broad theoretical turn. 
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Ever since, the ‘Other’ has been become an overarching critical category.  As often 
happens in theoretical critique, the term has been inflated with normative solemnity, 
freighted with ontology, dignified with metaphor (subaltern), reified to its own 
theoretical realm (alterity), and neologised to express process and intention (othering). 
Over forty years ago, however, philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1965, 22) defined the term in 
relation to cultural identity with surprising clarity and simplicity. 
When we discover that there are several cultures instead of just one and 
consequently at the time that we acknowledge the end of a sort of cultural 
monopoly, be it illusory or real, we are threatened with the destruction of our 
own discovery. Suddenly it becomes possible that there are just others, that we 
ourselves are an “other” among others. 
I summarise more recent theoretical treatments of the Other (provocative as I know 
this to be) with the observation that they are principally critical appraisals of cultural 
‘invasions.’ These intrusions affect not only continents and peoples, but classes, groups 
and cultural objects or identities many kinds, subjecting them to illegitimate 
institutionalised cultural and sexual power.  The ensuing ‘empires’ and hegemonies, 
established violently and driven by racism, are shown to ‘produce’ Others as 
subordinate, colonised, exotic, subaltern or infantile constructs.  This confrontation 
builds and sustains privilege on the one hand and victimhood and oppression on the 
Others, who are silenced, caricatured in representation, exploited and marginalised.  
Their authentic identities, both subjective and cultural, are tragically vitiated. Yet the 
‘differences’ themselves eventually constitute a challenge and a threat to the identities 
that unified the ‘centre,’ whose ‘borders’ are breached and endangered by the 
consequent dynamics of populations, cultures and technology.x 
While acknowledging the formative importance of this theoretical perspective in 
academic writing and its critical extension into literature, theatre, painting and many 
other creative areas, I intend to lay it to one side.  I propose to take a cooler look at a 
term often employed for zealous moral condemnation of familiar enemies (nota bene).  
Indeed, villainous perpetrators of hegemonic ‘Othering’ are so well-known that critics 
not infrequently take the liberty of caricature and derisive irony.  In effect, I want to 
view ‘the Other’ afresh and turn the concept to a quite different theoretical purpose.  
Whether the effect of my doing this alters the orthodox critical focus may well be a 
topic of further speculation. 
Seeing Others 
As I defined Others in the introduction, I refer to people (individuals, groups, peoples 
and entire civilisations, perhaps dating from centuries ago) concerning whom one has 
very little contact, very little knowledge and very little interest.  Jean-Paul Sartre (1944) 
famously aphorised in his play, No Exit, that ‘Hell is other people.’  For my purposes 
here, I disagree.  I want to suggest that we are not sufficiently familiar with ‘others’ to 
make that irascible, condemnatory judgement.  Nor would we be able, or inclined, to do 
anything to them, even to intrude upon their ‘cultural space’ (Simmel, 1971; Schuetz, 
1944), or feel that they have inadvertently intruded upon ours, unless we encounter 
them fortuitously in circumstances not of our own doing or choosing. 
When speaking of ‘others’ we are not, like the character in Sartre’s play, shut up for 
interminable hours with strangers in a featureless waiting room.  In any case, the people 
who make life hell for us are generally those we know all too well, including members 
of one’s own family.  That, I think, is the meaning and personal reference of Virginia 
Woolf’s enigmatic note for an unfinished novel (Woolf, 1921): ‘The eyes of others our 
prisons; their thoughts our cages.’ 
Nevertheless, far from consigning unknown, anonymous strangers to hell, we 
typically exercise a mild and well-disposed curiosity about complete strangers.  How 
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often have you heard someone admit to being an inveterate ‘people-watcher,’ 
confessing to the more or less harmless play of imagination?  This anonymous 
spectation might even be pleasurable, ranging from æsthetic observation to voyeuristic 
or erotic fantasy. 
The ‘others’ I am considering are people who, for all practical and even moral 
purposes, we know nothing at all about: hardly know and indeed hardly care.  In other 
words, strangers or foreignersxi – literally, as in the French, people who are far away, 
impossibly remote from our own immediate knowledge, experience and interests.  We 
do not need to ‘construct’ them as ‘other’ because what captures our attention is 
external: an easily observed ‘difference’ (in culture, language, skin colour or even 
religion, if visually symbolised).  We may barely know of their existence or what these 
external characteristics signify, much less their meaning and significance to others. 
Consider this at a personal level.  What do you know of or think about the people 
who live three doors down from you on your street?  And people two streets away from 
you? 
Consider this hypothetical case.  Hearing that I live on Clifton Street, and a friend 
asks me if I know whether Al Pine lives on Harrington Street, two streets over from my 
house.  I reflect a fraction of a second, look at the questioner, and merely say, ‘No, I’ve 
never heard of him.  In fact, I don’t know anyone on Harrington Street.’ I have little 
interest in why this person asked me about Al Pine.  To be interested I would need to 
know something about him, but I have no knowledge of his existence. 
If my friend then tells me that he very much wants to contact Al Pine and was 
hoping that I could supply him with some information, I may feel sympathy for my 
friend.  I may even offer to help by lending him my telephone directory.  But I feel no 
remorse or guilt for my ignorance of Al Pine’s existence or place of residence.  I feel no 
moral compunction or obligation in this regard, either toward Al Pine or my friend, 
because Al Pine is a total stranger, one of the many, many people in my suburb I do not 
know. I have had no need to know him, and unless I hear further reasons or information 
that situation will remain as before. 
Of course it is possible that my friend will provide me with reasons or information 
that will arouse my curiosity, sympathy or interest.  My friend might tell me that Al 
Pine is a capital fellow, or very entertaining, or an excellent political theorist; or that he 
has a fine, or a wonderfully peculiar, house; or that he is a master plumber who works 
for very reasonable rates. 
At this point I may indeed develop an interest in Al Pine, even though he remains, 
to me, a complete stranger.  But I may not.  My friend might continue to encourage me.  
By coincidence I might suddenly need a plumber.  Still, Al Pine remains just as much a 
stranger to me as I am to him. 
In the unlikely event that my friend should challenge my ignorance and 
indifference by asking me if I did not appreciate the fact that I shared a common 
humanity with Al Pine, I would be very surprised.  Of course I would willingly agree 
that I certainly did appreciate that.  But on reflection, I might point out to my friend that 
I share a common humanity with every person on earth, very few of whom I could ever 
expect to know, care about or communicate with. I could go further and point out that 
the sharing of a common humanity was not, on its own or automatically, a strong 
foundation for social and moral obligation.  For example I could rejoin to my friend that 
I fully acknowledge a shared common humanity with my bitterest enemies, as well as 
with murderous criminals and other desperadoes. 
I should anticipate a theoretical objection to this hypothetical.  A critic may wish to 
condemn the example of an ‘ordinary’ situation on the grounds that it presupposes a 
8 
 
‘liberal individualist,’ subjectivist or reductivist perspective.  It might be argued that the 
hypothetical case of my ignorance of Al Pine fails to incorporate the moral and 
structural properties of community and shared culture. I am not entirely convinced of 
such objections, given that those very properties reasonably and inescapably inhere in 
any coherent idea of an individual person, hypothetical or actual.  Moreover, it is 
difficult to see how philosophy can analyse the ethical implications of emotional 
dispositions without employing perceptual psychology and the ordinary language that 
captures life as it is experienced.  Schuetz (1944, 499), for example, notes the 
theoretical relevance of ‘the typical situation’ as it ‘presents itself to the common sense 
of a man who lives his everyday life within the group among his fellow-men.’ 
How far, then, can we take the hypothetical vignette?  Can it be applied more 
widely, even globally?  What about the vaunted ‘global community’ that is 
metaphorically but no less influentially created by electronic communications?   
The mass media do create in our minds an ephemeral, superficial perception of 
people and places far distant and remote from our own experience.  Documentary 
cinema and news broadcasts convey powerful images of wars, natural catastrophes and 
a selective sense of a globally inclusive political and economic drama.  This experience 
was largely invisible to us one or two generations ago – and remains largely invisible, 
or irrelevant, to most of the world’s population in their day to day, face to face struggle 
to live.  Mass mediated perceptions lend a degree of visual acquaintance, information 
and impressions of humanity’s common plights, even while these fleeting images may 
actually reinforce the strange and impenetrable character of other peoples’ lives, or 
indeed offer us grounds for fearing and hating them.  The dramatic stories and images 
are often very successful in engendering in us powerful emotional responses, ranging 
from empathy and joy to disgust and hatred. 
These forms of mediated recognition undoubtedly produce at least a superficial 
experience of psychological recognition. The question is whether this experience create 
a sense of family, community and solidarity, especially when the images are projected 
as powerful and proud symbols of cultural ‘difference.’  These mediations – of dreadful 
suffering, exotic culture and terrain, symbolic undertakings of international sport, 
charity and philanthropy in times of crisis and disaster – unquestionably elicit emotions 
of empathy, sorrow, magnanimity and pride.  Yet it is far from clear that Olympic 
heroics and the succour afforded to the vast suffering and death from a tsunami effect a 
transformation from Other to kindred friendship.  The mediated images seem at least as 
likely to intensify a sense of the remote and the strange. 
Meeting Others 
This brief overview of people in faraway places – whether at the distance of two 
suburban streets or an unvisited continent in the opposite hemisphere – begins to open 
up a view of emotional dispositions that it is normal (and for purposes of argument I 
will say is natural) toward strangers.  This is an ordinary disposition toward ‘others’: 
people we do not know, make no pretensions to care for and have no desire to establish 
relations with.  In other words, I am suggesting that, apart from the transient curiosity 
discussed above, there is no inherent instinct or necessity to recreate or dominate others, 
no drive to subjugate, weaken or destroy.  Yes, humans are gregarious; but naturally so, 
it might be said, only toward their own kind – their tribe, gens, skin, kin – whose 
language and ‘look’ you share.  Indeed, even granting a degree of playful curiosity.xii  
There is no natural obsession (akin to an original sin?) to interfere with, conquer, 
dominate, transform, enslave, convert or exploit those about whom we are ignorant.  
Even in the event of having a vague perception of ‘others,’ the experiential and moral 
context of that knowledge is that they are…not here, but there: foreigners. 
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This of course is not to deny that sheer ignorance or vague associations may 
become informed sufficiently to arouse purposes more fixed and interested than idle 
curiosity.  This may give rise to cultural purposes to explore, contact, examine, 
compare, communicate with and, of course, eventually to share and perhaps even to 
impose those purposes.  These aims are at least in part shared by modern day migrants 
and refugees, whose circumstances are often precarious and adventitious.  This was true 
of seventeenth-century colonial settlers, many of whom did not survive the precarious 
circumstances and were not happily welcomed by those peoples upon whom they 
imposed themselves. Trade and militant religion are no doubt the two paradigmatic 
purposes for communication with strangers – or at least that appears to have been the 
view of many people in both the East and the West over the centuries. 
Political theorists know that early European contact with North and South America 
and their archipelagos led to immediate curiosity, both scientific and philosophical.  It 
also led the Roman Catholic Church to debate the proposition that, if it is granted that 
savages possessed human souls, the Church must acknowledge an evangelical duty 
analogous to the civilising obligation embraced earlier by the Roman Empire.xiii 
Curiosity and attraction are, I suggest, well documented and in some ways benign 
emotional dispositions that people feel toward others: strangers.  Spontaneous wonder, 
of course, may easily expand to several aversive emotions of fear, embarrassment and 
shame.  These are emotions one often feels when meeting total strangers with the 
passing from curiosity to incomprehension, confusion, an inability to speak the same 
language (in the literal as well as the figurative sense), and the potential for, or 
inevitability of, intimacy.  Here I mean the shame of intruding upon the milieu of 
others, and in turn being oneself exposed to them.  There may also be disgust at how 
they are (or are not) dressed, at how they smell, what they eat, what they wear and how 
they adorn themselves. Perhaps there is even a simultaneous, mutual mixture of these 
emotions in how they treat each other, and how this in turn may dispose or oblige one to 
treat those in authority, for example, or if you are invited to eat with them, worship with 
them, sleep with them.  It is, of course, just as easy to imagine that visiting strangers 
will feel the same toward you.  You, also, are strange, very much the outsider to the 
stranger’s world of evaluations and expectations. 
We see – in a veiled but noticeable way in las Casas, in Hobbes and Locke, in 
Montaigne, Montesquieu and Rousseau – how early encounters with others quickly 
became a mirror in which Europeans could see themselves in a new light, again with 
emotional overtones of pride, envy, shame and guilt.  Here was a revelation of their own 
strangeness of manners and culture, showing the European inferiority in health 
compared to the savage’s robustness against the elements. Here European Christians 
became witness to the meanness of their suspicion, pomp and pride in the light of the 
candour, modesty and open friendliness of the natives.  Such reactions are well-
documented in the 16th and 17th-century travel literature of European explorers and 
colonists. Some Europeans saw the nakedness of the savages as a clear sign of their 
immorality and cultural inferiority.  But other Europeans saw with new eyes their own 
clothing as ridiculous, gaudy, pretentious and bizarre, to say nothing of its inaptness for 
climate and mobility – a view which the ‘savages’ must surely have felt with curious 
amazement. 
It was inevitable that this otherness, with its accompanying mild range of emotional 
dispositions, would give way to stronger, partly romantic and eventually hostile 
dispositions as the sense of strangeness gave way.  That is to say, the strangeness 
dissolved, just as I would evolve different (and perhaps equally unpredictable) 
dispositions should I actually meet Al Pine and make his acquaintance. 
10 
 
The perhaps original and certainly controversial point I am suggesting here is that 
the result of curiosity and interest is often negative, but this potential for conflict, 
conquest and colonial domination destroys, not ‘constructs,’ otherness.  We do not 
‘make an enemy’ (note well the common phrase that does imply a process of 
construction) by creating and imposing otherness.  Rather, we become enemies when 
otherness, the stranger-ness, is overcome, rubbed away.  It seems to me that this is an 
important distinction. In taking ‘possession’ we destroy the others (often in the literal 
sense).  We go to war.  We do what enemies do:  conquer and destroy each other, in part 
by violence and death, and in part by a gradual process of corruption and expropriation 
of the other culture.  In an encounter – a prolonged, curious, seizing of each other, a 
recognition of similitude, the unfathomable, the rare – you become often enamoured of 
the other: jealous and greedy and possessive. This in turn leads to force, deception, 
disillusionment, conflict, and hence to hatred and the desire to destroy. 
Conclusion 
Encountering strangers has happened from time immemorial, not simply since the 
creation of the nineteenth-century empires and their largely disastrous de-colonisation 
after World War II.  For the ancient, awful record in the Middle East and Europe, one 
can simply turn to the Old and New Testaments of the Bible for the chapter and verse of 
it.  Or go see Gladiator again.  Review Attila’s successful swathe across Europe to 
Rome in the 5th Century, the 8th Century Islamic conquest of Spain and Portugal under 
the command of Tarik ibn Zeyad, and the medieval Crusades.  But this is not to say that 
the West has not made a number of enemies since World War II.  Something of the 
same process, and on the same scale, is now being played out in Serbia, Turkey, 
Chechnya and Georgia. It raises the rhetorical question of whether the world might 
enjoy greater peace with a bit more otherness. 
That speculation calls to mind John Lennon’s song, Imagine, which seems to have 
become an anthem for Western peace movements.  Here is an archetypal evocation of 
the desire to embrace, or perhaps ignore, difference: to imagine a union of hearts while 
renouncing so many other passions that divide us into races, nations and congregations.  
There have always been aspects of the lyrics, apart from the dreamily saccharine music, 
which appalled me, but for reasons that were never very clear.  Lennon conjures up an 
Epicurean range of pagan values and pacific emotions,xiv imagining a communal utopia 
of comfort and passivity; freedom from guilt, power and want; and pleasures of all 
kinds, especially the erotic.  The cosmopolitan yearnings are definitely Hellenistic, 
complete with the sensual mood of sharing and caring, while allowing for a postmodern 
twist in the Christian theme of ‘peace and love.’  This mélange suggests how Lennon’s 
sentiments are indeed congenial to the late Roman Empire. There is the undercurrent of 
the ideal life as a luxurious sensorium, but the song’s staunchly universalising intent 
also proposes an imagined empire in which a lot of different things would first have to 
be destroyed.  ‘Imagine’ a world in which you cannot imagine any other creed or way of 
life, ‘…and the world will be one.’ 
Imagine: one, big, happy family, no doubt speaking English.   – ‘Tellement 
affreuse!’ the French would surely exclaim.  Sartre would probably expand his 
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i Emotion, an English rendering of the Latin animi motus or motu animalium, refers to the 
feeling of ‘inner motion,’ the commotio [commotion] or concitatio [tumult] we experience 
when we find a poem ‘moving’ or a piece of music ‘exciting.’ An emotion is experienced as a 
‘feeling’ that, when sufficiently strong, may dispose us to action: passio to actio.  
Psychologists have clinically established how these inner motions are organically expressed 
by elevated pulse, altered breathing and blood pressure, tears, blushing and muscular 
contractions, especially of the face, arms, hands and torso.  The inner feeling is not simply 
mentalistic in character, but is ‘expressed’ physically.  Emotional expressions in language, we 
may say, are linguistic evocations of the physical phenomena. 
ii ‘A friend is a lover, literally. The relationship between Latin amicus “friend” and amo “I 
love” is clear, as is the relationship between Greek philos “friend” and phileo, “I love.” In 
English, though, we have to go back a millennium before we see the verb related to friend. At 
that time, freond, the Old English word for “friend,” was simply the present participle of the 
verb freon, “to love.” The Germanic root behind this verb is fri-, “to like, love, be friendly to.” 
Closely linked to these concepts is “peace,” from a Germanic a noun from the root frithu. 
Descended from this noun are the personal names Frederick, “peaceful ruler,” and Siegfried, 
“victory peace.” The Germanic deity Frigg, goddess of love, lives on in the word Friday, 
“day of Frigg,” from an ancient translation of Latin Veneris dies, “day of Venus.”’ Extract 
from AHD (2006). 
iii The profound connection between love and hate is a theme of poetry and song from ancient 
times, and has been discussed widely in the literature of theoretical and clinical psychology.  
Leo Tolstoy (1969: 214), in The Kreutzer Sonata, expresses the idea in its extremity when the 
central character describes the marriage that ended in murdering his wife: ‘A period of love, a 
period of hate; a weak period of love, a brief period of hate; an intense period of love, a 
prolonged period of hate.  We did not then realize that his love and hate were different 
aspects of one and the same animal feeling.’ 
iv ‘strange adj. 1. Not previously known; unfamiliar. 2. a. Out of the ordinary; unusual or 
striking. b. Differing from the normal. 3. Not of one’s own or a particular locality, 
environment, or kind; exotic. Archaic Of, relating to, or characteristic of another place or part 
of the world; foreign. adv. 1. In a strange manner. [Middle English from Old French estrange 
extraordinary, foreign from Latin extraneus adventitious, foreign, from extra outside, from 
feminine ablative of exter outward.] stranger  n. 1. One who is neither a friend nor an 
acquaintance. 2. A foreigner, a newcomer, or an outsider. 3. One who is unaccustomed to or 
unacquainted with something specified; a novice: a stranger to our language; no stranger to 
hardship. 4. A visitor or guest.’ Extract from AHD (2006). 
v This aphorism has an interesting psychological dimension. The modern psychoanalytic 





your own worst enemy.  Therapists of several well-paid disciplines depend upon causing you 
to know this.  
vi A test of this distinction is posed by the vituperative lyrics of rap and hip hop artists such as 
Ice Cube, Waitin’ To Hate; Waterboys, Be My Enemy; Canibus, Hate U 2; Eminem, 3 Verses 
or Nail In the Coffin.  Their violent, obscene and nihilistic expressions of hatred – the 
gloating over crime, death, destruction and sexual despoliation – may for some be partly and 
purposefully subverted by irony, youthful bravado and the swagger of pop chart fame and 
riches.  The aesthetic frisson of these songs is intensified by blurring the line between anger 
and hatred. 
vii Since rhetoric is devoted to the conditions and possibilities of persuasive oratory, here 
Aristotle draws the lesson: ‘It is plain from all this that we can prove people to be friends or 
enemies; if they are not [enemies], we can make them out to be so;  if they claim to be 
[friends], we can refute their claim; if it is disputed whether an action was due to anger or 
hatred, we can attribute it to whichever of these we prefer’ (1382a19-23). 
viii This theme of unnatural combat is tragically mirrored in Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, based 
upon Plutarch’s account of the 5th Century BC Roman military hero, banished from his native 
city, allying himself with his former enemies, the Volcians, to do battle against his kinsmen. 
ix other  adj. 1. a. Being the remaining one of two or more. 2. Different from that or those 
implied or specified. 3. Of a different character or quality. 4. Of a different time or era either 
future or past: other centuries; other generations. 5. Additional; extra. 6. Opposite or contrary; 
reverse: the other side. n. 1. a. The remaining one of two or more: One took a taxi, and the 
other walked home. b. others The remaining ones of several pron. 1. A different or an 
additional person or thing: We’ll get someone or other to replace him. 2. others People aside 
from oneself.. [Middle English from Old English Åther.] (AHD, 2006). 
x Alluding, inter alia, to Said (1978, 1993); Bhabha (1990, 1994); Spivak (1982). 
xi foreigner   n. 1. One who is from a foreign country or place. 2. One who is from outside a 
particular group or community; an outsider. foreign adj. Abbr. for. 1. Located away from 
one’s native country. [Middle English forein from Old French forain from Late Latin foranus 
on the outside from Latin foras out of doors, outside. (AHD, 2006). 
xii Western tourists returning from China several years ago remarked on the experience of 
peasants in rural areas approaching a tourist, pointing to and touching a tourist’s blonde or red 
hair, laughing and pointing out to others its exotic colour and curls. 
xiii Accounts of cruelty by the conquistadors toward the natives of South America, published by 
Bartolome de las Casas (1474-1566), a Spanish friar, moved the Spanish king, Carlos V, to 
convene the Council of the Indies to determine whether the natives were human beings 
possessed of a soul and thus potential converts of the Holy Roman Catholic Church. Carlos V, 





on behalf of the Church rather than merely the pursuit of territory and material riches. 
(Palfrey, 1998). The Conquistadors, asserting otherwise, hired Gines de Sepulveda to argue 
the case that the natives were sub-humans and therefore without rights.  Las Casas advanced 
the thesis that they possessed both souls and intelligence, and were thus deserving of the 
duties and privileges of the Church as well as the crown. Las Casas’ publications probably 
served as a model for Thomas More’s Utopia, which first appeared in 1516. An early English 
edition of las Casas’ work appeared in the 17th century (Casas, 1699).  A standard history of 
these events is Prescott (1966). 
xiv Hedone, sensual pleasure; euphrosune, fun, euphoria; aponia, lack of pain; ataraxia, lack of 
confusion; katastematikos, sedate, tranquil. 
